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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case requires resolution of the Department of Health and Welfare's ("Department") right 
of reimbursement under I.C. 8 56-209b(4). The Department claims that Jess C. Matey ("Jess") has 
an obligation to reimburse the Department $76,757.70 from the proceeds of an underinsured motor 
vehicle policy before any of the insurance proceeds can be deposited into his Special Needs Trust. 
The Mateys contend that the Department's right to reimbursement does not have "absolute priority" 
and that it is limited by the Supreme Court of the United States' recent decision in Arkansas Dept. 
of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 126 S.Ct. 1752 (2006). The Mateys contend that the 
magistrate court correctly determined that the Department is entitled to recover $4,817.88 and that 
the district court correctly affirmed this ruling. The Mateys respectfully request that this Court 
affirm the lower courts' decisions. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Factual Background. 
On July 6,2006, the Mateys, as Jess' natural parents and guardians, filed a Petition to Settle 
Underinsured Motor Vehicle Claim of Incapacitated Person and Approve Payment to Special Needs 
Trust. (R., p. 5). The Mateys' Petition explains that Jess was involved in a serious auto collision 
on June 17,2004 when he was sixteen-years-old. (R. p. 5, at 7 1). He sustained a severe traumatic 
brain injury and now requires around the clock care. (a at p. 6, at 72). 
At the time of the collision, the Mateys were insured by State Farm Insurance Company 
("State Farm"). ( a ) .  The Mateys had an underlying policy with underinsured motor vehicle 
coverage limits of $250,000. ( a ) .  They also had an umbrella policy providing an additional 
$1,000,000 in underinsured motor vehicle coverage. (u). State Farm agreed to waive certain policy 
provisions and make payment of the $1,250,000 to the Jess C. Matey Special Needs Trust ("SNT") 
conditioned uwon the Matevs obtaining court approval of the wrowosed settlement and 
payment to the SNT. ( a  at 7 7) (emphasis added). 
The Mateys, in accordance withLC. 3 68-1403(5), gave the Department notice of the hearing 
concerning their Petition. (R., p. 12-13). On July 17,2006, the Department objected to the Mateys' 
Petition, claiming that it had the right to be reimbursed for all expenses it paid on behalf of Jess 
before any money could be paid to the SNT. (R., p. 17). The Department had no other objections 
to the Mateys' Petition. ( a ) .  
On July 21, 2006, the Mateys filed a Motion for Leave to Deposit Funds with Court and 
Conduct Bifurcated Proceeding on the petition to Settle Underinsured Motor Vehicle Claim. (R., 
p. 36) Through their Motion, the Mateys requested permission to settle the claim with State Farm 
and pay over to the court the total amount of reimbursement claimed by the Department. ( E a t  pp. 
38-39). The Mateys asked the magistrate court to then hold the money until such time as the amount 
of the Department's right of reimbursement could be litigated. ( a ) .  The magistrate court denied 
the Matey's Motion on July 26, 2006. (R., p. 50). 
On August 30,2006, State Farm filed a Motion to Intervene in this matter to protect its rights 
and interests. (R., p. 84). The magistrate court granted the Motion on September 5,2006. (R., p. 
87). On September 13, 2006, State Farm filed a Motion for Court Order Re: Determination of 
Pending Claims Against State Farm. (R., p. 95). State Farm filed its Motion because the 
Department took the position that the magistrate court's ruling on the Matey's Petition would not 
preclude the Department from asserting a right of reimbursement directly against State Farm. (R., 
p. 105, at 7 6). 
On September 26, 2006, the magistrate court conducted a hearing on State Fann's Motion 
for Court Order Re: Determination of Pending Claims Against State Farm (Tr., pp. 8-1 5) and the 
Matey's Petition (Tr., pp. 16-44). During that hearing, the Department stipulated to the creation of 
the SNT. (Tr., p. 9, lines 2-9). The parties also agreed that the real issue to be decided by the 
magistrate court was the amount of money that should be paid into the SNT given the Department's 
right of reimbursement. (d). The magistrate court also toolc evidence concerning Jess' damages. 
(Tr., pp. 16-24). The Mateys introduced the following exhibits to support their claim: 
Exhibit 1 : Proration Chart 
Exhibit 2: Proof of Loss Submitted to State Farm 
Exhibit 3: Settlement Agreement between the Mateys and State Farm 
Exhibit 4: Medical Bill Summary and Medical Bills 
Exhibit 5: Miscellaneous Expenses Summary 
Exhibit 6: Patient Evaluation and Medical Summary - Terry Winkler, M.D. 
Exhibit 7: Life Care Plan - Terry Winkler, M.D. 
Exhibit 8: Assessment of the Present Value of the Future Care Expenses for Jess Matey 
- Cornelius H o h a n  
Exhibit 9: Assessment of Economic Loss - Cornelius Hofman 
Exhibit 10: Jess C. Matey Special Needs Trust 
Exhibit 12: Mateys' Auto Policy 
Exhibit 13: Matey's Umbrella Policy 
The Department did not object to any of these exhibits being admitted into evidence. (Tr., p. 24, 
lines 1-2). 
Based on the evidence contained in the exhibits, the Mateys argued that Jess' total damages 
arising out of the June 24,2004 collision were as follows:' 
Type of Damage 
Past Medical Expenses Paid by Medicaid 
Other Past Medical Expenses Paid 
Miscellaneous Expenses Paid by Mateys 
Past Lost Earnings 
Future Lost Earnings 
Lost Household Services 
Future Medical Expenses 
Non-Economic Damages 
Amount 
$ 60,752.54 
$ 345,562.74 
$ 30,031.18 
$ 18,685.00 
$ 2,538,755.50 
$ 338,355.00 
$ 16,288,637.00 
$ 268,026.56 
Total Value of Claim $ 19,888,805.52 
' The number allocated for noneconomic damages is based on the cap set forth in I.C. 5 
06-1603. 
The' Depaiment did not dispute the damages claimed. The Mateys argued that the State Farm 
settlement proceeds should be allocated among the various categories of damages as follows: 
Type of Damage 
Past Medical Expenses Paid by Medicaid 
Other Past Medical Expenses 
Miscellaneous Expenses Paid by Mateys 
Past Lost Earnings 
Fulure Lost E k i n g s  
Lost Household Services 
Future Medical Expenses 
Non-Economic Damages 
Amount O h  of 
Claim 
0.00305 
0.01737 
0.00151 
0.00094 
0.12765 
0.01701 
0.81899 
0.01348 
Amount of 
Settlement 
$3,818.26 
$21,718.42 
$1,887.44 
$1,174.34 
$159,559.32 
$21,265.42 
$1,023,731.48 
$16,845.32 
Total Value of Claim $19,888,805.52 
Settlement Amount $1,250,000.00 
This proration allocated the shortfall among all of the various categories of damages so that both Jess 
and the Department would bear the burden of the shortfall equitably. At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the magistrate court took the matter under advisement. (Tr., p. 40, lines 3-5). 
On October 10, 2006, the magistrate court entered its Second Memorandum Decision and 
Order. (R., p. 130). The magistrate court found: 
In the present case, the parties have not stipulated to the value of the Petitioner's total 
claim, nor to that part of it that would constitute payment for medical expense. 
However, the Petitioners have presented evidence in Exhibit #1 that the total value 
of the claim is $19,888,805.52 and, as noted above, the amount due Medicaid is 
.305% of this value. The State has not rebutted these propositions in am manner. 
Applying the logic of Ahlborn, the Petitioners therefore claim that the State should 
beentitledto .305% of$1,250,000or $3818.26. Absent any evidence to the contrary, 
this Court must agree. 
(R., p. 132) (emphasis added). The magistrate court also ruled that upon payment of the insurance 
proceeds in accordance with the court's decision State Farm was to be discharged from any 
additional claims. (R., p. 133). The court requested that the Mateys and State Farm provide 
appropriate orders to the court for its approval. (a). 
On November 2, 2006, the magistrate court entered a1 Order Granting Petition to Settle 
Underinsured Motor Vehicle Claim of Incapacitated Person and Approve Payment to Special Needs 
Trust. (R., p. 157). In that Order, the magistrate court ordered State Farm to pay the Department 
$4,585.30 to satisfy the Department's right of reimbursement. (R., p. 160). The magistrate court 
found that the Department was entitled to a slightly higher rate of reimbursement than originally 
determined because, at the time of the hearing on the Petition, the Department had actually paid 
$76,757.70 in total medical expenses for Jess rather than $60,752.54 as originally presented. (R., 
p. 160, fil 1. The Mateys do not dispute the higher rate of reimbursement finally awarded by the 
magistrate court. ( a ) .  The magistrate court's order stated that it was a final order from which an 
appeal may be taken. ( a ) .  
On approximately November 8,2006, in order to resolve State Farm's interests in this matter, 
the parties entered into a Stipulation Re: Distribution of Funds and Determination of Pending Claims 
Against State Farm. (R., p. 162). The Stipulation basically provided that State Farm would deposit 
$180,000 into a bank account held jointly by the Department and the SNT. The funds will be 
disbursed upon resolution of this dispute. (R., p. 163). The remaining settlement proceeds were 
distributed to the SNT and were used to pay attomey's fees incurred by the Mateys. (R., p. 164) The 
Department filed an appeal of this matter to the district court on October 16,2006. (R., p. 135). 
The district court held a hearing on this matter on June 28, 2007. (Tr., p. 48). The district 
court ruled from the bench and affirmed the magistrate court's ruling. (Tr., p. 99, line 17). See also 
Order dated July 3, 2007. (R., p. 225). 
11. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented in this case involves statutory construction and is a legal issue over 
which this Court exercises de novo review. Dvet v. McKinley, 139 Idaho 526,528, 81 P.3d 1236, 
1238 (2003). 
111. ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
The Mateys request that they be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and expenses on appeal 
pursuant to I.C. Cj 12-1 17(1). Section 12-1 17(1) states: 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil judicial 
proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a city, a county or other taxing 
district and aperson, the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable attomey's 
fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party against 
whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
I.C. 5 12-117(1). 
The Department has no reasonable basis in fact or law for taking the position that it is entitled 
to full reimbursement before any money can be deposited into the SNT. As such, the Mateys request 
that they be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and expenses for having to defend this appeal. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Department Cannot Rely upon Davis v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, I.C. 
9 56-209b(6) or I.C. 8 68-1405(4). 
The Department has confined its appeal to a single legal issue.' Is it entitIed to be reimbursed 
from settlement proceeds allocated for future medical expenses? To answer this question, the 
Department contends that this Court can and should resolve this question using only Davis v. Idaho 
Devt. of Health and Welfare, 130 Idaho 469,943 P.2d 59 (1997), I.C. 5 56-209b(6), and I.C. 5 68- 
1405(4). The Department's analysis is fundamentally flawed. The Supreme Court of the United 
States' recent decision in Arkansas Deot. of Health and 13uman Services v. Ahlborn, 126 S.Ct. 1752 
(2006) implicitly overruled &s and any presumptions created by I.C. 5 s  56-209b(6) and 68- 
1. The Idaho Reimbursement System Prior to Ahlborn. 
Before Ahlborn was decided, Idaho's Medicaid reimbursement system gave the Department 
certain priorities. The Idaho Court of Appeals addressed this system in Davis v. Idaho Devt. of 
The Department made the statement in its Opening Brief that the magistrate court 
committed error when it allowed the Mateys to unilaterally allocate damages. (Department's 
O ~ e n i n ~  Brief, p. 9). This is incorrect. The magistrate court held an evidentiary hearing to 
determine Jess' damages and how the settlement proceeds should be allocated. Moreover, the 
Department's Statement of Issues on Appeal does not challenge the magistrate court's 
determination of damages or the allocation (s R. pp. 227-28) and there is no legal argument or 
authority cited by the Department in its Opening Brief "When issues on appeal are not 
supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered . . . . A 
party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are 
lacking." Anson v. Les Bois Race Track, Inc., 130 Idaho 303,304,939 P.2d 1382, 1384 (1997). 
Health and Welfare, 130 Idaho 469,943 P.2d 59 (1997). In the plaintiff was involved in a 
plane crash. He sued the manufacturer of a defective part and made a recovery. At trial, however, 
the jury found that the plaintiff was 35% at fault and his damages were reduced accordingly. APter 
the jury made its decision, but before a final judgment was entered, Davis settled his claim against 
the manufacturer. The settlement agreement did not allocate what portion of the settlement was for 
payment of medical expenses. 
Davis contended that the Department's right of reimbursement for medical expenses had to 
be reduced by the portion of comparative fault determined by the jury (i.e., 35%) as well as the 
Department's pro rata share of costs and attorney's fees. The Department objected to the 35% 
comparative fault reduction. The Idaho Court of Appeals agreed with the Department and held: 
Section 56-209b(4), as it existed when the Medicaid payments were made, stated in 
part: 
If a settlement or judgment is received by the recipient without 
delineating what portion of the settlement or judgment is in payment 
of medical expenses, it will be presumed that the settlement or 
judgment applies first to the medical expenses incurred by the 
recipient in an amount equal to the expenditure for medical assistance 
benefits paid by the department as a result of the occurrence giving 
rise to the payment or payments to the recipient. 
This subsection is unambiguous and describes the precise circumstances that 
occurred here. Following the jury's award, but before a final judgment was entered, 
Davis entered into a settlement agreement with the manufacturers of the component 
part. The settlement agreement did not specifi what portion of the settlement was 
in payment of the medical expenses. As this circumstances falls directly within the 
dictates of $56-209b(4), the statute specifically and unambiguously requires that the 
settlement be applied "first" to Medicaid payments in an amount "equal to the 
expenditures for medical benefits assistance paid by the department." Davis must 
therefore fully reimburse DHW for the medical expenses paid for his benefit, minus 
DHW's pro rata share of attorney fees and costs. 
130 Idaho at 472,943 P.2d at 62 (quoting I.C. 3 56-209b(4)). 
The Department's reliance o n w  in this case, however, is flawed for two reasons. First, 
the presumption relied upon in is inapplicable. I.C. § 56-209b has changed since was 
decided, but the presumption language relied upon by the Court of Appeals remains the same and 
is now found in LC. 5 56-209b(6). It states in relevant part: 
If a settlement or judgment is received bv the recipient without delineating what 
portion of the settlement or judgment is in payment of medical expenses, it will be 
presumed that the settlement or judgment applies first to the medical expenses 
incurred by the recipient in an amount equal to the expenditure for medical assistance 
benefits paid by the department as a result of the occurrence giving rise to the 
payment or payments to the recipient. 
LC. 5 56-209b(6) (emphasis added). 
Unlike the situation in-, Jess did notreceive the settlement proceeds without delineating 
what portion of the settlement is in payment of medical expenses. The settlement proceeds were 
paid to the Jess C. Matey Special Needs Trust after the magistrate court's approval of the allocation. 
The funds were never paid to Jess. The real problem with the Department's reliance on Davis, 
however, is its failure to recognize that and the presumption in I.C. 5 56-209b(6) are no longer 
good law. 
The Supreme Court of the United States implicitly overruled and invalidated the 
statutory presumption when it decided Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 
126 S.Ct. 1752 (2006). & subsection A2 below). The Department also relies upon I.C. $ 68- 
1405(4) which states: "A court order for payment of money or property to a special needs trust shall 
include a provision that all statutory liens properly perfected at the time of the court's order, and in 
favor of the Idaho department of health and welfare or any county or city of this state, shall be 
satisfied first." This statute only addresses the liming of payment. It does not establish priority. 
Priority of payment is established in the more specific provisions of I.C. § 56-209b. Morever, even 
$68-1405(4) were interpreted to give the Department priority to payment, it would be invalid under 
Ahlborn. 
2. Ahlborn invalidated any priority given to the Department by  I.C. 5 56- 
209b(6) and I.C. 5 68-1405(4). 
Heidi Ahlborn was 19 years old when she sustained a severe traumatic brain injury as a result 
of an auto collision. She was left totally atd permanently disabled as a result of her injuries. The 
Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services, the state's Medicaid agency, paid 
approximately $215,000 for Ahlborn's medical treatment. When Ahlborn settled her third party 
claim for $550,000, Medicaid sought reimbursement for & of the payments it made even though the 
settlement recovery amounted to only about one sixth of Ahlbom's total damages. Ahlborn brought 
a declaratory judgment action to limit Medicaid's reimbursement to that portion of the settlement 
amount (approximately $35,000) attributable to past medical expenses. 
The Ahlborn case eventually made its way to the Supreme Court of the United States. When 
the Court decided the case it summarized the position taken by the Arkansas Department of Health 
and Welfare: 
The State, through [the statutes it passed to comply with Federal Medicaid 
laws], claims an entitlement to more than just that portion of a judgment or 
settlement that represents payment for medical expenses. It claims a right to recover 
the entirety of the costs it paid on the Medicaid recipient's behalf. Accordingly, if, 
for example, a recipient sues alone and settles her entire action against a third-party 
tortfeasor for $20,000, and ADHS has paid that amount or more to medical providers 
on her behalf, ADHS gets the whole settlement and the recipient is left with nothing. 
This is so even when the parties to the settlement allocate damages between medical 
costs, on the one hand, and other injuries like lost wages, on the other. The same rule 
also would apply, it seems, if the recovery were the result not of a settlement but of 
a jury verdict. In that case, under the Arkansas statute, ADHS could recover the full 
$20,000 in the face of a jury allocation of, say only $10,000 for medical expenses. 
That this is what the Arkansas statute requires has been confirmed by the 
State's Supreme Court. In Arkansas Dept. of Human Services v. Ferrel, 336 Ark. 
297, 984 S.W.2d 807 (1999), the court refused to endorse an equitable, nontextual 
interpretation of the statute. Rejecting a Medicaid recipient's argument that he ought 
to retain some of a settlement that was insufficient to cover both his and Medicaid's 
expenses, the court explained: 
Given the clear, unambiguous language of the statute, it is apparent 
that the legislature intended that ADHS's ability to recoup Medicaid 
payments froin third parties or recipients not be restricted by 
equitable subrogation principles such as the 'made whole' rule stated 
in [Franklin v. Healthsource of Arkansas, 328 Ark. 163,942 S.W.2d 
837 (1997)l. By creating an automatic legal assignment which 
expressly becomes a statutory lien, [Ark. Code Ann. $ 20-77-307 
(1991)l makes an unequivocal statement that the ADHS's ability to 
recover Medicaid payments from insurance settlements, if it so 
chooses, is superior to that of the recipient even when the settlement 
does not pay all the recipient's medical costs." Id., at 308, 984 
S.W.2d at 811. 
Ahlborn, 126 S.Ct. at 1760 (Respondent's Appendix, pp. 11). 
The Supreme Court rejected the Arkansas Department's argument and implicitly overruled 
the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in Arkansas D e ~ t .  of Human Services v. Ferrel, 336 Ark. 
297, 984 S.W.2d 807 (1999). The Supreme Court found that federal provisions governing 
Medicaid's reimbursement rights limited the Medicaid agency to "recovery of payments for medical 
care." 126 S.Ct. at 1761. The Court also ruled that the State itself could not adopt more expansive 
reimbursement rules because any reimbursement out of damages paid to a plaintiff for lost wages 
or pain and suffering or other damages recovered by the plaintiff would contravene the anti-lien 
provision of the Medicaid Act. 126 S.Ct. at 1762-64. The situation in this case is no different than 
in Ahlborn. Ahlborn invalidated any priority given by LC. 5 59-206b(6) and § 68-1405(4) and 
implicitly overruled the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in m. Because these authorities are 
no longer good law, the decisions of the lower court should be affirmed. 
B. The Lower Courts Correctly Determined that the Department's Right of 
Reimbursement is Limited to Funds Allocated for Repayment o f u  Medical Expenses 
Paid by the Department. 
The Department's positions in this case are somewhat difficult to reconcile. On one hand, 
the Department contends that it has priority to payment in full based on m, LC. 5 56-209b(6) and 
§ 68-1405(4). On the other hand, the Department admits that under Ahlborn it does not have any 
right to reimbursement from any settlement proceeds allocated for: property losses; lost earnings; 
or non-economic damages. (Department's Openine Brief, p. 10). The real disagreement between 
the parties and the issue to be decided by this Court is whether the Department can be reimbursed 
from settlement proceeds allocated for future medical expenses or whether it is limited to settlement 
funds allocated for repayment of a medical expenses actually paid by the Department. 
When the Ahlborn court rendered its decision, it concluded that the State's right to 
reimbursement was limited to the right to recover that portion of a settlement that presents 'payment 
for medical care.' Ahlborn, 126 S.Ct. at 1761. The Department latches 011 to the "payment for 
medical care" language to support its position that it is entitled to be reimbursed from funds allocated 
for future medical expenses since it constitutes "medical care." The Department fails to recognize, 
however, that there was no discussion in Ahlborn as to whether future medical expenses were even 
an issue in that case. It is inappropriate to take a single phrase out of context and use it to support 
a position. If this Court examines the Ahlborn Court's rationale, it should conclude that the 
Department is not entitled to reimbursement from funds allocated for future medical expenses. 
As explained in Ahlborn, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a sets forth all of the various legal provisions that 
states must have in place in order to receive Medicaid funding from the federal government. These 
provisions are not a "floor" upon which states are free to build, and, in fact, states are prohibited 
from imposing more onerous reimbursement provisions by the anti-lien provisions set forth in 42 
U.S.C. 5 1396a(a)(18) and 42 U.S.C. 5 1396p. Ahlborn, 126 S.Ct. at 1762. 
Section 1396a(25)(H) addresses state law reimbursement requirements. It requires states to 
adopt laws: 
that to the extent that oavment has been made under the State plan for medical 
assistance in any case where a third party has a legal liability to make payment for 
such assistance, the State has in effect laws under which, to the extent that vavment 
has been made under the State plan for medical assistance for health care items or 
services furnished to an individual, the State is considered to have accluired the rights 
of such individual to vavment bv anv other vartv for such health care items or 
services. 
42 U.S.C. 5 1396a(25)(H) (emphasis added). The plain language of this statute requires states to 
adopt laws which give their Medicaid agencies the right to recover payments from third parties for 
expenditures made by the agency for health care items and services. If a state adopted a statute 
which gave its Medicaid agency the right to adopt a broader reimbursement right (i.e., the right to 
recover future medical expenses), it would be invalid under Ahlbom. 
Consistent with 42 U.S.C. 5 1396a(25)(H), the Idaho legislature adopted I.C. 5 56-209b(3). 
Section 56-209b(3) states: 
In all cases where the department of health and welfare through the medical 
assistance program has or will be required to pay medical expenses for a recipient 
and that recipient is entitled to recover any or all such medical expenses from any 
third party or entity, the department of health and welfare will be subrogated to 
the rights of the reci~ient o the extent of the amount of medical assistance 
benefits vaid bv the department as the result of the occurrence giving rise to the 
claim against the third party or entity. 
LC. 5 56-209b(3) (emphasis added). 
The Department does not cite or discuss this provision anywhere in its Opening Brief. Under 
the plain, unambiguous language of this statute the Department only has a claim to proceeds 
allocated for medical expenses actually paid by the Department. This is consistent with Federal 
Medicaid Requirements. The bottom line is that the Department did not acquire Jess' right to 
recover future medical expenses from the third party tortfeasors. By asserting a right to these funds, 
the Department is violating the federal anti-lien provisions set forth in 42 U.S.C. $ I396a(a)(18) and 
42 U.S.C. $1396~ .  Because the Department'sposition is without merit, this court should affirm the 
lower courts' decisions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoingreasons, the Mateys respectfully request that this Court affirm the Judgment 
entered by the magistrate court and affirmed by the district cou'rt. The Mateys also request that they 
be awarded reasonable costs and attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. Ij 12-1 17(1). 
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